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Nuc Lear D iscourse ancI Its D iscontents,
or, ApocAlypsE Now or Never
Jean BEThkE ElskrAiN

Human beings think most often in images; a terrible or delightful
picture comes into our minds and then we seek to find words to express
it, to capture it, to make it somehow manageable. Thus it is with the
possibility of nuclear war. Our images are fixed. The scenes of utter
destruction at Hiroshima and Nagasaki; two cities laid waste; people
disappeared, remaining as shadows on cement or persisting in a terrible
and painful twilight zone of lingering death from radiation. Or, even
years later, moving through the world carrying within them a perceived
taint, a threat to themselves and others: “I am one who has been touched
in the most frightening way by the most horrible sort of weapon.”
I taught a class at the University of Massachusetts/Amherst for
five years called “Issues of War and Peace in a Nuclear Age.” Inevitably,
we would arrive at the section of the course that required a discussion
of the dropping of the atomic bombs in World War 2. By that point the
students realized that hundreds of thousands of people already had been
incinerated in the fire-bombings of Dresden, Hamburg, and Tokyo. So
they knew that body counts could mount up to almost unimaginable
figures with so-called conventional weapons. But the notion of nuclear
war and nuclear weaponry and its use is somehow different. The damage
persists, carried literally in the bodies of survivors, encoded, if you will,
in human tissue itself. Using Michael Walzer’s book Just and Unjust
Wars,1 we discussed the distinction he makes between the justice of
strategic bombing of German cities in World War 2 and the injustice of
the dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. I am not
interested in pursuing how or why he makes that distinction so much
as I am interested in alerting the reader to the discussion that took shape
as this question was taken up by students.
One particular semester, there was a group of students who saw
in the use of nuclear weaponry an extension of conventional war
making. They recognized, of course, the long-term threat to individuals
and the environment that nuclear devastation carries, but they argued
that it was but another weapon, a horribly destructive weapon, to be
used, as it was in this instance, to end a horribly destructive war. They
spoke in what Freeman Dyson would call the rhetoric of the warriors or
would-be warriors. This is a world that gives rise to its own discursive
style. The world of the warriors, Dyson notes in his book Weapons and
Hope, promotes a style that is “deliberately cool, attempting to exclude
overt emotion and rhetoric...emphasizing technical accuracy and
objectivity.”2 This world of the warrior domain is male dominated and,
interestingly, all of the students who spoke out in favor of the use of
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atomic weapons in World War 2 were young men. A number of them had
fathers who fought in the Pacific theater in World War 2. It is likely that
there were young women who shared this perspective but who felt
inhibited in speaking out or endorsing nuclear weaponry.
A second voice emerged in the course of the discussion, the one
that Dyson calls the voice of the victims or would-be victims. This
rhetoric of the victims is “women and children dominated.” Even as the
warriors’ world describes the outcome of war “in the language of
exchange ratios and cost effectiveness, the victims’world describes it in
the language of tragedy,”3 frequently laced with eschatological fears.
More and more victims, or those who see themselves as potential
victims, peer over the edge of the abyss and come back convinced that
an apocalypse looms soon. The students who expressed this anticipation
or fear were those who were harsh in their condemnation of the United
States for having introduced the nuclear threat into the world of war and
states.
One young woman, a Japanese exchange student, having listened
patiently for several days to the young Americans, to the discourse of the
warriors and the victims, raised her hand slowly but deliberately. The
class quieted down. She spoke hesitantly, she had difficulty with the
language, and then she said, “What happened at Hiroshima and
Nagasaki was not war, it was something else.” Class ended at that
moment, although we had fifteen minutes left in the period, because all
of us were too stunned to speak. What was that ‘something else’ she
referred to? My hunch is that we all have a sense that a nuclear weapon
is not war but is something else. Even the warriors realized that some
extra step was taken with the use of this weaponry.
Here we are, forty years plus after the dropping of the atomic
bombs; they have not been used since save in testing situations, and we
are still struggling with ways to deal with our apprehensions, to deal with
the proliferation of nuclear technology, to deal with the recognition that
at least one of our would-be enemies has a nuclear potential equal to our
own. We live in a postwar world that has been defined by the term
deterrence and the advocates of deterrence would say that it has
obviously worked; the proof is in the pudding, there has been no nuclear
war. I’m not interested in debating deterrence in this essay. But I am
interested in taking a good look at the different discourses that have
emerged around nuclear realities, or, perhaps better put, the discourses
we have available to us to deal with the reality of nuclear weapons. I’m
interested in rhetorical practices. How do we come to grips with the
dangers and possibilities of the present historic moment as these revolve
around war and rumors of war of a potentially nuclear sort?
I suggested in my recent book. Women and War, that there are
currently three primary clashing discourses; the strategic, the
psychological and the apocalyptic.4 These are dominant voices that vie
for our attention where nuclear war, nuclear weapons, and nuclear
dangers are concerned.
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The strategic voice is preeminently that of Dyson’s warrior: cool,
objective, scientific, and overwhelmingly male. But more women aim to
get in on this strategic enterprise, to certify female voices as au thoritative
spokespersons for and of this world of knowledge and power. The cool,
in command strategic voice talks in the language of cost benefit, control,
and crisis management. Since 1982 women’s leadership conferences on
national security have been held with the aim of devising ways for women
to become equal partners in the discussion and formulation of national
security policy. Women too would speak in the voice of the knowing
insider. There is a problem here—for this strategic discourse is often
strangely disassociated.
To understand the contemporary discourse of the warriors, of
those who have what it takes to deal with notions of megadeaths and
nuclear exchange, we must go back to the discourse of realism in
international relations and in the study of international relations. Those
who locate themselves within contemporary realist discourse trace their
roots to Thucydides’ Peloponnesian Wars and the so-called Melian
dialogue in which the Athenians proclaimed to the hapless citizens of
Melos that might is the right that reigns, to Machiavelli and his Prince,
to Hobbes and his nasty, brutish, short state of nature, and to other
sources leading into the present and culminating in the emergence of the
discursive hegemony of realism, realpolitik. Realism, in turn, became
professionalized. It got located in the academy, and the way in which
students of international relations have been taught the discourse is
often by pitting realism against something that the realist calls idealism;
that is, alternatives to realism are evaluated from the standpoint of
realism. Hence the bin labeled idealism which for the realist is more or
less synonymous with dangerous, if well-intentioned, innocence
concerning the world’s ways.
Realism is based on two primary and quite simple principles: we
live in a dangerous world that no one can fully control: and, we must
assume that others, if they have the power, will be prepared to use it
against those who have less power if their interests are at stake. The
realist also emphasizes that the causes of war are inherent, that they are
a constitutive feature of an international system in which the nation
state remains the arbiter of its own interest and the judge of the means
by which its security is best assured.
Historic realism, molded into a discursive tradition, involves a
way of thinking, a set of assumptions about the human condition, and
a potent rhetoric. The great strength of thinkers located in the canon as
realist forefathers is their historical perspicuity, theirwillingness to deal
with the problem of “dirty hands:" their boldness in offering an orientation
to the question of collective violence; and their insistence that the limits,
as well as the uses, of force be treated explicitly, preferably in a mood
shorn of crusading enthusiasms, universalist aspirations, and
triumphalist trumpeting. But something happened when realism got
pinioned within the academy; it became palpably less realistic, less
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attuned to the political and historic landscape than in its classical
formulations. Encumbered with technical jargon, specialists in this
discourse all too often began to speak to or at one another or to their
counterparts in government. Unabashedly male dominated, oriented to
state sovereignty, presuming unitaiy notions of power and national
interest, practitioners of the discourse of realism got caught up in a wider
quest for a scientific language that came out in such forms as game
theory and other abstract models that would, so the story went, work if
one could just get the parameters right.
Characteristic of the modem, professionalized discourse of
international relations in its most recent incarnations then, is a
proclamation of scientific knowledge—that cool, obj ective warrior language
that Dyson talks about, a presumption that politics can be reduced to
questions of security, conflict management and damage control; a
patina of ahistorical and anodyne terminology (window of vulnerability,
collateral damage, crisis management, escalation dominance), and a
pronounced insouciance concerning the will to power embedded in the
concepts and metaphors that comprise the discourse in the first place.
Although particular forms of this quest for scientific certainty
come and go, the dangers inherent in professionalized warrior rhetoric
remain. 1 have no better word for what I have in mind here than
disassociation. For although the specialist as a constructor of abstract
scenarios, cloaked in the mantle of scientific study, presents himself as
one who describes the world as it is, he is in fact presuming that we have
control over events when in fact we often do not. This prompted Hannah
Arendt to argue in 1969 that scientifically-minded brain trusters bustling
about in think tanks, universities, and government bureaucracies
should be criticized harshly not because they were thinking the
unthinkable, as some of them liked to boast, but rather because they did
not think at all.5 The cool language of strategy, having become
disassociated, more and more removed from its subject matter and from
events that it conjures with, prompts a modem classical realist, Michael
Howard to state:
When I read the flood ofscenarios in strategicjournals about first
strike capabilities, counter force or countervailing strategies,
flexible response, escalation dominance, and the rest of the
postulate of nuclear theology, I ask myself in bewilderment, this
war they are describing, what is it about: The defense ofWestern
Europe, access to the Gulf, the protection of Japan? If so, why
is this goal not mentioned and why is the strategy not related to
the progress of the conflict in these regions? But if it is not
related to this kind of specific object, what are they talking
about? Has not the bulk of American thinking become exactly
what Clausewitz described, something that, because it is divorced
from any political context, is pointless and devoid of sense?6

N u c l e a r D is c o u r s e

265

That women have been pretty much excluded from this enterprise
is not its most obvious flaw and it is one that can be remedied. Women
can engage in the activity even if representations of women and the
sphere with which they have been historically linked remains an
absence that helps to make possible the much cherished parsimony of
the preferred model or simulation or analysis in the first place. So
professionalized strategic discourse, located either in the academies or
government bureaucracies. Including the Pentagon, whether as abstract
strategic doctrine advertising itself as realism brought up to date, or as
alternatives that would somehow take us beyond realism into ever more
scientific realms of discussion, seems to me one of the most dubious of
the many dubious sciences presenting truth claims that mask the power
plays embedded in the discourse and the practices it legitimates.
But I can’t simply leave it at that. The warrior's voice cannot be
wholly discredited. We have too many examples historically of instances
in which failure to prepare for the onslaught of devastation from a
determined foe in fact lead to greater loss of life and to a more prolonged
struggle than would have been the case had those under attack thought
in more strategic terms, thought in the language and through the
presumptions of the warriors in order to prepare themselves. Is there
any way to reclaim the assumptions of the realist and the warrior, to strip
them of their claims to dominance, and to see within these inherited
discourses something we can draw upon to help situate us in a world of
nuclear threat? These are questions that a few of those speaking on and
through strategic discourse have themselves attempted to confront in
recent years (Kennan and McNamara, for example). By softening the
presumptions of the strategic voice and by insisting that in fact ethical
and moral dimensions must be brought to bear in strategic thinking, the
purveyors of strategic discourse and its attendant rhetoric give a tacit,
if not explicit, bow in the direction of the discourse of the victims.
For example: Joseph Nye, author of Nuclear Ethics, insists that
moral reasoning about nuclear weapons is inescapable in democracies.
He acknowledges that many practitioners of strategic discourse have
ignored ethics even as many moral absolutists opposed to nuclear
weapons refuse to tolerate nuclear weapons at all and that, too, he finds
unrealistic in a world in which nuclear weapons are here to stay. He
acknowledges that “strategists tend to live in an esoteric world of
abstract calculations and a belief in a mystical religion called deterrence
which is invoked to justify whatever is convenient. Strategists would do
well to realize that there are no experts, only specialists on the subject
of nuclear war and to listen more carefully to the moralists’ criticisms. "7
Finally, however, even those who would inject ethics into strategic
discourse wind up endorsing and calling for the maintenance or
managing of a situation which those who embrace either a psychological
or an apocalyptic voice find unacceptable, even reprehensible: that is,
they continue to insist that the United States must maintain a credible
nuclear deterrent, that, in the words of Allison, Camsdale, and Nye,
authors of Hawks, Doves, and Owls:
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to avoid war it is necessary, though not sufficient, to maintain
the capability of our military forces and the credibility of our
military intentions and resolve. Our nuclear arsenal continues
to play an important role in deterring aggression against the
territory of the United States, our allies, and other areas of vital
interest to us....There seems little doubt that deterrence of
deliberate nuclear or conventional attack on the American
homeland is effective, robust, and stable....Our suggestions for
actions to be taken and actions to be avoided are designed to
ensure that Soviet leaders see no advantage in the balance of
nuclear forces and to maximize the credibility of our nuclear
deterrent.8
How is it then that this more modest deployment of strategic
discourse and rhetoric is found wholly objectionable by the other two
primary voices in the contemporary debate, the psychological and the
apocalyptic? I will turn first to the voice of psychological discourse on
nuclear weaponry or, as the practitioners of this discourse call it,
nuclearism.
This alternative language is more readily available to ordinary
citizens than the cooler, technical language of strategic discourse.
Living as we do in an era in which every issue quickly becomes one for
therapy and gets turned into a psychological problem, it is perhaps not
surprising that nuclear weapons and war have been psychologized and
that psychological discourse should proliferate on war and peace
questions. The practitioners of psychological discourse claim that we
must all feel dread in our current situation and that if we are not
suffering nuclear nightmares, this is additional proof that we are
infected with nuclearism, that is, a massive denial of the reality and
threat that nuclear weapons present to our own survival and that of our
children and their children.
It is interesting that many fewer specialists in national security
are pessimistic about our future prospects than the general public. The
general public, more caught up in either the psychologistic or the
apocalyptic mode or some combination of the two, is far more pessimistic
about the prospects of a major nuclear war between the United States
and the Soviet Union before the end of the century. So the discourses
that most proliferate in our public debate as non-specialist voices are
those most convinced that we are in a terrible danger zone, if not
doomed. In surveys on the question: how likely is a major nuclear war
between the United States and the Soviet Union before the end of the
century, one finds that nearly half the general public say nuclear war is
likely, but specialists’ answers cluster between about one in one
hundred to one in one thousand who find it likely. Not too much is
proven by this sort of finding, but it does indicate that those who
specialize in the study of nuclear deterrence and the study of the risks
of nuclear war, and have a language that they can bring to bear that
makes that threat seem more manageable, are more hopeful about our
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prospects than those who not only do not share that language but who
eschew its use as either amoral or immoral.
Psychological discourse about nuclear weaponry is one variant
of the discourse of victims. The reigning assumption is that we have all
been made ill by nuclear weapons, that there is the bomb out there, but
there is also a bomb in us, that we are corrupted by the disease of
nuclearism. Those most corrupted are those who preach and practice
nuclear deterrence and speak in the language of strategy. Psychologistic
nuclear discourse often condemns the motivations of those who traffic
in nuclear issues even as it challenges the rest of us to bring our
suppressed fears to the surface.
Psychologistic discourse does more than simply warn us. it
chastises and judges, dividing the world up into three categories: those
who are knowingly corrupted, namely, the traffickers in strategic
nuclear discourse; those who are unknowingly corrupted, namely, those
who claim that they are not frightened to death by the prospect of nuclear
war because they do not believe it is the central danger that we, “the
benumbed," face; and a third and preferred category, those who have
stripped off the numbness, who have rid themselves of symptoms of the
pathology of nuclearism and who, facing the dangers straight on, are
part of what these rhetoricians hope will be a growing movement to
obliterate the nuclear disease. The metaphors deployed are those of
disease, of pathology, of malignance.
There is much to be said for the warnings that these rhetoricians
utter. It is the case that, confronted with horror or the prospect of
something horrible, we tend to stick our heads in the sand and avoid
facing that which should be faced. They are right to express moral
anguish. My concern is that the metaphors with, which they work and
the rhetoric that encapsulates those metaphors do not take sufficient
account of the constraints of the world in which we all exist. For example:
Even as the practitioners of this discourse argue for the elaboration of
a transnational self, a species identity, the world in which we actually live
is one in which the self is more and more defined by national and
religious identifications. What we see happening is not so much a new
internationalism as a resurgence of militant nationalisms. It doesn’t
seem very helpful, given this potent development, to argue that this is
further symptomology, a spreading disease, and that only physicians
who have understood the nature of the disease can cure us.
Vaclav Havel, the great Czech playwright and political essayist,
tells stories of earnest and sincere western peace activists journeying to
central eastern Europe, making contact with dissidents, refusniks,
political rebels in these societies, including Czechoslovakia, and he
indicates that he finds it very difficult to explain to them why he does not
sign petitions for immediate nuclear disarmament. For we citizens of
central eastern Europe, he argues, that is not the central danger, not the
most immediate threat to our lives, to our culture, and to our existence.
And he indicates that what, to him, seems a rather remote prospect.
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whereas imprisonment for conscience is an immediate one, doesn’t seem
to carry much weight with Westerners. They, he insists, can concentrate
on the nuclear question precisely because they do not face certain
immediate threats. He is sad that they do so in a way that gives them
a moralistic language that labels those who disagree with them as
corrupt or evil.10
Drawing categories from individual psychology and putting them
to work to cover complex structural realities and determinants sanctions
an overpersonalizing of important political realities. Take, for example,
the rhetoric of Helen Caldicott, a medical doctor and leader in raising
alarms about a nuclear disaster she finds imminent. She writes of
missile envy as a psychopathology of men or a particular group of men.
She describes the planet as an organic entity that is “terminally ill,
infected with lethal macrobes that are metastasizing rapidly the way
cancer spreads in the body.”9 The problem with the cancer metaphor is
that one cuts a cancer out or irradiates it into oblivion, if it is found in
the human body. The equivalent, presumably, would be nuclear
disarmament and the destruction of stockpiled weapons. But when the
analogy gets pressed between the structural realities of international
politics and individual psychopathology, the inadequacies ofthis discourse
become clear. In Caldicott’s argument women get dubbed with the
rescue mission because they innately understand conflict resolution,
being “nurturers bom with strong feelings for nurturing given their
anatomies and hormonal constitutions. Males having an excess of the
hormonal output of androgen are bound to deploy these deadly toys.” 11
One variant, then, on this discourse is the presumption that if many of
us are ill, men are, by definition, hopelessly infected by nature. This
formulation does not seem terribly helpful. Males are always going to
have an excess of androgen, and it’s an excess, of course, only if one sets
up the female as the single human norm. So the upshot is that males
need to be remade. No scheme that calls for the remaking of human
nature as a precondition for a better world has ever panned out. Indeed,
it seems politically naive, and the organic and psychological metaphors
potentially dangerous, in terms of the sorts of interventions that they
may invite.
But it would be inappropriate to end on this note. Just as the
practitioners of strategic discourse point to important realities in our
situation, the practitioners of psychologistic discourse alert us to certain
discomfiting facts. It is the case that most of the time we refuse to
confront that which we do not understand, or that which seems
unbearably grim. And this fatalistic outlook may, in the words of Robert
Lifton, bind our eyes and minds tightly closed with a message of
helplessness.12 Although I am strongly convinced that there is a more
specifically civic discourse better able to rouse us to appropriate and
critical action than psychologistic analogizing, there is a truth here that
cannot be entirely gainsaid: the world inside and the world out there are
in fact related, and human beings are constituted, in part, in and
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through the ways in which they introject or internalize the outer and the
ways in which the inner is projected into the outer.
With that, let me move on to the third of the three discourses that
dominate our thinking about war and peace—the apocalyptic. The
apocalypticist assures that we are doomed. There are several examples
of the genre, from Jonathan Schell’s The Fate of the Earth, to the
practitioners of so-called end time fundamentalism. Each issues dire
warnings that we are lost. In Schell’s case, we are lost unless we move
to put an immediate end to that which plagues us and guarantees utter
destruction. He posits his argument in absolutist either/ors. At the end
of his book he insists that: “two paths and two paths only lie before us,
one leads to death, the other to life.” If we choose the first path, if we
numbly refuse to acknowledge the nearness ofextinction, all the
while increasing our preparations to bring it about, then we, in
effect, become the allies of death and in everything we do our
attachment to life will weaken, our vision, blinded to the abyss
that is open to our feet, will dim and grow confused, our will,
discouraged by the thought oftrying to build on such a precarious
foundation anything that is meant to last will slacken and we will
sink into stupefaction as though we were gradually weaning
ourselves from life in preparation for the end.13
There is a powerful hortatory flavor to apocalyptic rhetoric, whether in
its secular form, as in Schell’s sustained and dire prophesy, or in its
explicitly religious manifestations.
Paradoxically, central to this posture is a mode of reasoning that
is also favored by many contemporary “disassociated” realists,
proliferation of so-called worst-case scenarios. The rhetorical ante gets
upped and stays at fever pitch in apocalyptic argumentation. What one
finds in the feminist practitioners—just one among a vast array of
feminist voices—is the claim that war is threatening disorder; peace is
healing order: war is human bestiality (male and male only); peace is
human benevolence (female and female alone). The present world of war
and preparation for war flows directly from a male ontology of absolute
discordance which will be supplanted at some happy point by a world of
peace and nurturing which flows, or will, from an ontology ofconcordance
that is specifically or exclusively female.
For the apocalyplicists, peace is a utopian dream, a fullness of
being, that evokes images of celebration and understanding where all the
barriers between peoples have been melted away. This notion of peace
traffics in binary opposites. As I indicated the choices are presented in
stark either/ors. So we find the contrast between masculinism, patriarchy,
violence, disorder and matriarchy, non-violence, harmonious order.
Here are just a couple of recent examples, and one can proliferate them
almost endlessly. I draw these from a book called Reweaving the Web of
Life.'4 One writer says wars are nothing short of tools for organized
killing presided over by men deemed the best, and in fact they are.
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Missiles and nuclear weapons are extensions of the male self which is
capable of little but violence. If a passion for life is to flourish, women are
the bearers of this life loving energy, writes another. Feminism and non
violence see power only in its healthy form, leading naturally to cooperative
and nurturing behavior necessary for a harmonious existence.15 This
apocalyptic, cosmic feminism is animated by a quest for attunement
with some higher unity, often a benevolent view of nature which then
gets contrasted to the despoilations of modem nuclear culture.
One of the practitioners of this apocalyptic mode insists that the
only route to transformation would be for women who “bear a different
relationship to children than men do and are more connected and
empathic with the environment than men are,”16to gain absolute power
over the process of reproduction and, in a situation utterly free of any
male influence, go on to reduce the number of men in the human
population to an ideal of ten percent. This alone guarantees continuing
and everlasting peace on earth. The writer claims that this ratio could
be achieved in one generation if half the population reproduced in the
normal manner, and one half by ‘ovular merging’—that is, the combination
of two ovum to create a female person. We have here a very extreme
version of the insistence that we must literally transform human
beings—in this case create females and eliminate males—in order to
ensure peace or the possibility of peace and destroy nuclear weapons.
But the dominant apocalyptic voice in the population at large,
though heard less by those of us in the academy, is that which flows from
fundamentalist and religious end timers who anticipate a nuclear
holocaust. This is for them a source ofjoy, a sign that the ‘rapture’—the
divine rescue of true believers from the holocaust—is drawing nigh. Just
before the earth gets devoured in an orgy of destruction, true believers
will be lifted up and drawn to God as promised in the Book of Revelation.
Apocalyptic warnings are balm to the spirit of many, rather than a way
to strike terror. Writes A.G. Mojtabai, author of Blessed Assurance, At
Home With the Bomb in Amarillo, Texas, in a recent essay:
.. .people coming to the Bible belt to speak out against the nuclear
arms race ought to be forewarned. The Physicians for Social
Responsibility worst case blast conflagration scenario for nuclear
war is so familiar it’s almost cozy. It is part of the script for the
tribulation that is coming soon to winnow the earth in preparation
for the triumphal second coming of Christ. And the message is
not prevention but exemption. The message is you’ve been
warned. Declare for Jesus while there is yet time.17
Mojtabai notes that the Doomsday clock of the Union of Concerned
Scientists, telling us how few minutes are left until nuclear midnight has
been reached, “has been used by revivalists for centuries in the harvesting
of souls. The message is beating the clock, not turning it back....The
message is, ‘Are you ready? It’s going to happen any moment.’” All this
is normal fare: apocalyptic anticipations, terrors, and yearnings are
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nothing new, but there is a new element here and that is our ability to
“bring down the show ourselves.”18 Majtabai describes the fundamentalist
habit, which is to reduce alternatives to exclusive disjunctions, all or
nothing, absolute good or absolute evil, black or white. And that. I have
already indicated, is a characteristic of apocalyptic thinking in general,
whether in its secular versions or, here, in the end time version.
The religious apocalyptic version taps more Americans than
either the strategic or psychologists voices, for the fundamentalist mode
extends well beyond the American Bible Belt. A Nielson survey released
a couple of years ago indicated that over 60 million Americans, about
forty percent of all television viewers, regularly listened to preachers who
tell them that we can do nothing to prevent nuclear war in our lifetime.
A 1984 Yankelovilch poll revealed that four out of ten Americans believe
that when the Bible predicts that the earth will be destroyed, it’s telling
us about nuclear war. And, according to Mojtabai’s study, the Citizen’s
Network report documented that of four thousand evangelical
fundamentalists who attended the annual national religious broadcasters
convention, an estimated three thousand are dispensationalists.
Dispensationalism is a doctrine that goes back to the 19th Century; it
reduces the Bible to a single basic plot: God puts man to the test and
man fails. And within the dispensationalist mode, which has different
stages, we come to the age of the Kingdom which is on the horizon, which
will bring the sorry history of humankind on earth to a close. The view,
again, is that those who have been saved will be raptured, will be drawn
up as the tribulation spreads and the vial of wrath is poured into the air
and the earth itself destroyed. This message of doom and hope, of
promised eternal redemption, goes out over fourteen hundred religious
stations in the United States.
Is there any way out of or through these rhetorical practices, if
each has the weaknesses that I have cited along with some very specific
strengths? A language in and through which to express the sentiments
of civic life and the dangers and possibilities of the present moment: that
is the challenge. But what might that language be and how might we
come to it, recognizing, of course, that transformations in the way in
which we think about things and the rhetoric we deploy will not in itself
suffice to bring about the ends we seek. At the conclusion of Women and
War, I talked about breaking the deadlock of war’s mobilized language.
Perhaps I should have said the mobilized language of war and peace, for
a good bit of the rhetoric that I have elaborated is a language that looks
to peace, but only through the most terrible and extreme imagery of war.
Ryszard Kapuscinski, in an essay called “1945,” wrote the following:
What does it mean to think in wartime images? It means seeing
everything as existing in a state ofextreme tension, as breathing
cmelty and dread. For wartime reality is a world of extreme
Manichean reduction which erases all intermediate hues, gentle,
warm, and limits everything to a sharp aggressive counterpoint,
to black and white, to the primordial struggle of two forces, good
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and evil. Only the good, in other words us, and the bad, meaning
everything that stands in our way, which appears to us and
which we lump into the sinister category ofevil. And it is curious
and disheartening that much of the language of peace is cast in
the language of war, that peace people think in wartime images,
that is, in a struggle of good versus evil.19
This mobilized language is infused within the metaphors and tropes of
everyday discourse. We are weaned on such opposites as good versus
evil, peace versus war, just versus unjust. To deflect this way of thinking
is impossible so long as we remain enthralled by grand teleologies of
historic winners or losers, or of bad war people versus good peace people;
so long as our identities are laced through with absolute moralisms; and
so long as we seek or require on this earth a unifying experience of the
sort that total war or perpetual peace alone seems to promise.
To appreciate the relativity of all antagonisms and friendships,
to see in others neither angels nor demons, puts one on a track different
from that laid down by those who would organize and systematize reality
in some of the relentlessly total ways I have here been describing. The
discourse I am calling for as an alternative to the nuclear discourses that
have thus far prevailed eschews all-or-nothing pronouncements of
utopian and apocalyptic prophets, seeking instead to articulate the
limits of the world in which we live, yet to sustain space for meaningful
action, for what Hannah Arendt called new beginnings. Unlike the
practitioners of strategic discourse at its most unrelenting, the voice I
call for infuses an ethical dimension devoid of sanctimony. Unlike
psychologists discourse at its most extreme, the voice I call for rejects
handy labels that some of us can use to tag the others of us pathological
or ill. Unlike the apocalyptic voice, the voice I call for is attuned to the
provisional nature of enmities and friendships in politics, aware of the
fact that those who are foreign will always present ns with a situation of
estrangement but this need not become the occasion for enmity.
I would call this the voice of the hopeful, anti-utopian citizen who
acknowledges a world of bewildering diversity in which we are nonetheless
invited to search for commonalities as cherished achievements. After
all, we are all mortal, we all fear for our children’s future, we all breathe
the same air, and we must all confront, at this point, the possibility of
a similar and terrible fate. Although we may never know the new heaven
and the new earth promised in the Book of Revelation, and we shall not
achieve a world in which there shall be neither mourning nor crying nor
pain, there is the possibility that we can begin to take action and to think
and act in ways that Abraham Lincoln once called “disenthralled.” We
require a discourse that draws upon the strengths, but rejects the
excesses of the strategic, the psychological, and the apocalyptic voices
that I have here elaborated.
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